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Post by johnthornton on Jun 21, 2021 16:24:04 GMT -5
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdfWhat, if anything, does this case mean for ALJs? "The Constitution therefore forbids the enforcement of statutory restrictions on the Director that insulate the decisions of APJs from his direction and supervision. To be clear, the Director need not review every decision of the PTAB. What matters is that the Director have the discretion to review decisions rendered by APJs. In this way, the President remains responsible for the exercise of executive power—and through him, the exercise of executive power remains accountable to the people."
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Post by x on Jun 21, 2021 17:08:55 GMT -5
Sure sounds like doctrine that would render the APA unconstitutional.
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Post by carrickfergus on Jun 21, 2021 17:24:18 GMT -5
How so? Apjs are not aljs, the apa wasn't at issue here (I don't think), and I'm not aware af any alj body that issues decisions not subject to meaningful review up the administrative ladder.
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Post by lurkerbelow on Jun 21, 2021 17:26:57 GMT -5
Administrative law scholars:  However, I suspect that this particular gravy train is over: Real world lawyers arguing for big clients who did not get the results they wanted:  |
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Post by ba on Jun 21, 2021 19:28:21 GMT -5
Sure sounds like doctrine that would render the APA unconstitutional. Strongly disagree. The Court endorsed the APA adjudication system expressly in the decision, which is typically when ALJs make decisions that the agency retains plenary review of them. APJs were different because the Director did not retain that authority, giving them the authority of a principal officer to make the “final” administrative decision. Like the APA system, the Court made clear that a principal officer of the agency must retain control of the review of the adjudication hearing decision. The decision has little impact on the vast majority of administrative adjudication systems, but it does make the APA style system essentially constitutionally required. It eliminates Congressional flexibility outside the APA style system, but largely endorses the system that exists in most agencies. |
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Post by superalj on Jun 21, 2021 19:34:47 GMT -5
APA has been on life support since Lucia and I think, sadly, is unconstitutional especially if ever decided by this SCOTUS. What keeps me up at nights is taking Lucia and these cases to their logical conclusion and that is ALJs work at the pleasure and will of the POTUS. The next POTUS may decide to purge us all and replace with his or her own rubes.
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Post by ba on Jun 21, 2021 19:42:00 GMT -5
APA has been on life support since Lucia and I think, sadly, is unconstitutional especially if ever decided by this SCOTUS. What keeps me up at nights is taking Lucia and these cases to their logical conclusion and that is ALJs work at the pleasure and will of the POTUS. The next POTUS may decide to purge us all and replace with his or her own rubes. Removal isn’t an issue here and the Court’s remedy actually protected the removal protections of APJs. However, the Court also endorsed the APA and pointed out why APJ’s were different. On page 15 of the opinion, as they note the long history of agency plenary review, the Court states: “ The Administrative Procedure Act, from its inception, authorized agency heads to review such decisions. 5 U. S. C. §557(b). And “higher-level agency reconsideration” by the agency head is the standard way to maintain political accountability and effective oversight for adjudication that takes place outside the confines of §557(b). Walker & Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 141, 157 (2019). That review is what most agencies have and all ALJ decisions go through, even though the details may differ. APJs were different because they weren’t subject to that (giving them a power of a principal officer absent the Court’s remedy). While there are things to be worried about for the ALJ system, this isn’t it. |
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Post by superalj on Jun 21, 2021 19:52:56 GMT -5
Hope you’re right BA since you actually read the opinion.
It just seems to me that “APA” and “substantial evidence” don’t mean as much as they used to. I just hope our Union will insist on our judicial independence and recognition of the APA during negotiations and while they can with current POTUS.
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Post by ba on Jun 23, 2021 6:02:43 GMT -5
I think this is the crux of the matter in all these Administrative Judge cases: "...APJs are still exercising executive power and must remain “dependent upon the President.” 1 Annals of Cong., at 611–612 (J. Madison); see Oil States, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). The activities of executive officers may “take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the "Executive Power,’” for which the President is ultimately responsible. Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 305, n. 4 (2013) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 1). Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from any executive review, the President can neither oversee the PTAB himself nor “attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 496. APJs accordingly exercise power that conflicts with the design of the Appointments Clause “to preserve political accountability.” Edmond, 520 U. S., at 663." Well, if those Administrative Judges are exercising Executive Power and must remain dependent upon the President, then they shouldn't be called Judges. Who needs decisional independence anyway? Administrative Law Judge decisions should not be subjected to executive review, and that is exactly why they should not be in the Executive Branch. Executive Agency decisions should be subject only to judicial review by an independent, unbiased, neutral factfinder/adjudicator free from dependency on the President or political accountability. Except that the agency has always had backend control of ALJ decisions. The portion of APA the Court cited states: (b) When the agency did not preside at the reception of the evidence, the presiding employee or, in cases not subject to section 554(d) of this title, an employee qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 556 of this title, shall initially decide the case unless the agency requires, either in specific cases or by general rule, the entire record to be certified to it for decision. When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule. On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule. When the agency makes the decision without having presided at the reception of the evidence, the presiding employee or an employee qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 556 of this title shall first recommend a decision, except that in rule making or determining applications for initial licenses— (1) instead thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or one of its responsible employees may recommend a decision; or (2) this procedure may be omitted in a case in which the agency finds on the record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires. The critical difference is that when the agency changes the ALJ decision, it is apparent and the adversely affected party can seek judicial review, point to the unbiased ALJ decision in their favor and argue that the agency’s biased decision to the contrary is arbitrary and capricious. |
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Post by rightspeech on Jun 23, 2021 6:52:46 GMT -5
so then the problem is the agency head is not accountable to the president because he serves a term and can only be fired for cause. The agency head, and therefore the ALJ or agency head decision, is not dependent on the president. There's no political accountability.
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Post by superalj on Jun 23, 2021 22:17:56 GMT -5
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Post by roymcavoy on Jun 24, 2021 8:28:36 GMT -5
seems like one of the Justices (Kagan, I think) specifically noted in that USSC ruling that SSA commissioner was ripe fruit for picking under the rationale from that holding. |
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Post by carrickfergus on Jul 15, 2021 10:56:21 GMT -5
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Post by lurkerbelow on Jul 17, 2021 16:06:17 GMT -5
I really can't find it in my heart to feel sorry for those shareholders. |
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